I am particularly concerned with two broad transitions in legal scholarship over the last fifteen years or so: first the development of a harsh challenge to "traditional" or "mainstream"scholarshiprepresentedbytheself-conscious"schools"oflegalscholarship nowknownas"lawandeconomics"and"CLS"or"CLS".Theseschoolsproclaimboththeir distinctivenessandtheircriticalambitionsmoreassertivelythandothevariousstrandsof themainstreamtowhichtheyrespond,whetherthesebeknownbysomemoniker("legal process", "law and society", "law and literature", etc.) or simply as "legal scholarship". Legalscholarshipwhichbreakswiththemainstream,whetheroftheright,leftorcenter, marksitsdepartureinpartbyshiftinginterdisciplinaryassociations(importingtheoriesof interpretation, moral philosophy, economics or post-structuralist criticism to legal scholarship)andinpartbyalteringtheirpoliticalprogram. Second, I am interested in the developments within left, and, to lesser extent, right and "mainstream" scholarship which have occurred as these challenges matured and began taking account of one another. Both CLS and law and economics -like the mainstream "law and literature" movement -have experienced second or third generation struggles andtransitionssincefirstbreakingloosefromthemainstream.Althoughthescholarshipof each school developed in part through substantive discussions of particular doctrinal or methodological or institutional issues, these struggles were also importantly marked by alterations in participating legal scholars' accommodative strategies to the common anxieties about thinking and doing, by shifts in interdisciplinary strategies and tonal polemics. In this essay, I have focused most intensely on the development of "CLS" scholarship, in part because I am most familiar with that history and in part because the Bremen Conferencewasprimarilyinterestingasanexchangebetweenlegalscholarsofthe"left". Inlookingatleftlegalscholarship,Iammostinterestedintherelationshipbetweenwork producedduringthefirstwaveoftheCLSmovementduringthe1970sandworkproduced morerecently,inpartbyanacademicgenerationwhostudiedunderbothmainstreamand CLS scholars, a generation which sees its work as a response to both and often writes in the argot of "post-modernism", "post-structuralism", or "feminism". This transition, like the initiating break with the mainstream, has been marked by a shift in both interdisciplinaryassociationsandpoliticalstyle. I should say a word about my use of the word "mainstream". In terming "CLS" "left" or "law and economics" "right", I have simply adopted the self-proclaimed positions of scholars producing work in each school. Although these characterizations might well be challenged -and indeed the politics of "left" and "right" scholarship could bear closer scrutiny-theywouldlikelybeacceptedbythosemostcloselyidentifiedwitheachschool. Inanycase,Ifeelcomfortabledroppingthequotationmarks. The term "mainstream" is an entirely different matter. For one thing, mainstreamers' uneasinessabouttheirrelationshiptointellectionandpoliticsexpressesitselfasadistaste G e r m a n L a w J o u r n a l forlabelsofanybutthemostbenigndescriptiveanddepoliticizedsort-referringvaguely to method ("law and literature") or doctrinal orientation ("legal process"). They like to reserve political labels like "right" or "left" for private convictions and would resist both applying political labels to legal scholarship and appropriating labels they feel proud to acknowledge outside the context of their scholarly work. Most importantly, moreover, mainstream scholarship is in many ways more diverse than either of the schools which respondtoit.Indeed,itconstitutesasinglestrandonlyasithasbeenrespondedtoassuch -andperhapsonlyintheimaginationofthosemakingtheresponse. That said, I will retain the label, for the mainstream does seem to relate in a singular fashion to the problematic I am most concerned about in this essay -the tangled relationshipbetweenscholarshipontheonehandandintellectionorpoliticsontheother. ThemainstreamscholarIhaveinmindhasdominatedtheNorthAmericanlegalacademy atleastsincethefifties,butisprobablymostoftenassociatedwiththeGreatSociety,itself ahighwatermarkofliberalisminlegalthought.Mainstreamliberalshaveparticipatedin the changes of intellectual focus and political tone of the seventies and eighties without alteringtheirpoliticalortheoreticalorientation.
B.LegalScholarsandtheWorldofIdeas
Legalscholarshaveanuneasyrelationshiptotheliteraturesofphilosophy,politicaltheory, literarycriticism,history,sociology,economics-indeedtootherdisciplinesgenerally.The mainstreamscholarbearsthisuneasinessgracefully.Manyoftheextra-legalnotionsupon whichherelieshavebeendomesticatedwithinlegaltheoryor"jurisprudence"andhisselfconscious eclecticism encourages a range of extra-legal borrowings. Nevertheless, the relationshipbetweenthecoreofmainstreamdoctrinalelaboration,analysisandadvocacy andtheperipheryoflegaltheory,policyandinterdisciplinaryworkofvarioussortsremains ananxiousone. To an extent this is simply the uneasiness of our common profession. Law teachers are both lawyers and academics, straddling the worlds of commerce and thought. We are often paid more than our colleagues in other academic departments and less than our classmatesinpractice.Wewonderwhetherwemightnotmoreconsistentlyhavelivedout the logic of one or the other of our identities. At the same time, all who engage in the elaborationanddefenseoflegalacademiaparticipateinlegalculture'sgeneraluneasiness about ideas. On the one hand, law and legal academia present themselves as humbly disconnected from high (and perhaps irrelevant or effete) culture. Law is street smart rather than scholarly. At the same time, however, both legal culture and legal academia, present themselves as the embodiment of a moral culture above, or removed from the complex difficulties of the human sciences. Propositions of morality, intention and the general good which the philosopher might find platitudinous are straightforwardly asserted and confidently defended within legal culture. In this, law carries culture above thecontroversiesofnit-pickingacademics. Much might be and has been made about law's fascination with and uneasiness about intellection. For example, we might read the law's discomfort with -even exclusion ofintuition,philosophy,religionormysticism,asanexpressionoflegalculture'smisogynist, homophobicoranti-semiticimagination.Wemightreadlaw'spreoccupationwithitsown reasonasacolonialextensionofNorthernindustrialprotestantism.Law'sfascinationwith highculturemightbereadasthearrogantpretensionofamonopolizingprofession-our participation in the historical turn to positivism and science associated in the U.S. with everymovefromcommercetoprofessionalstatus. Howeverwereadit,thelawandthelegalacademicexpresstheirtroubledrelationshipto the intellectual in myriad ways: in the historically parallel consolidation of the legal profession and academy, in the demands which legal argument has made since the collapse of formalism for interdisciplinary borrowings, and in the pressures which the rituals of legal publication and academic promotion exert for conspicuous erudition, and more. As a first step, we might read legal culture's subtle obsession with the boundaries between law and everything else or between legal theory and legal practice as indicia of this troubled relationship. And these boundary concerns structure both our professional cultureandourdoctrinalorscholarlywork. Ontheprofessionalside,weseeitinthecomplexrelationshipsbetweenlegalfacultiesand theworldofpractice,or,moreimmediately,withinfacultiesbetweenthosewhoearntheir respectbyveneratingorbydisdaininglegalpractice.Itisnotsurprisingthatbothleftand rightbegantheirchallengestothemainstreambycalling:Iamtheoryandyouarepractice, forthesearetheprofessionaldivisionsmostreadilyavailabletopractitionersofacademic politics. In our discipline, critique begins the project of self-definition by challenging the purity of either the theory or the practice of the mainstream. But soon the distinction reappeared within both critical movements and relations with the mainstream became morecomplex,forlegalscholarshipisself-consciouslyboththeoryandpracticeinallofits manifestations. Onthesideofdoctrineandscholarship,weseethistroubledanddoubledconnectionto thoughtintheacademy'soscillationbetweenassertionsofitsinsightfulspecialnessandits aw shucks humble pie. Jurisprudential schools and tendencies distinguish themselves by toutingeitherthelaw'suniquereason-inthehermeticsoflegalprocessorthewisdomof "thinking like a lawyer" -or its intimate connection with the traditions of literature, sociologyandpolicyscience.Doctrinesrepeatthisdistinctionbetweentheknowledgesof law and life -in their endless respect for the differences between public and private, objective and subjective, substance and process, interpretation and application, law and facts,legislativeandjudicial,etc.G e r m a n L a w J o u r n a l Inthissection,Ipursuethetracesofthisdoubleuneasinessthroughthescholarlyworkof themainstreamandthedevelopmentofaleftresponse.Doingsorequiresthatwerecall thestabilityofmainstreamliberalisminlegalscholarship-heirtothelegalrealismofthe nineteen twenties and thirties -in both its more complacent fifties and critical sixties manifestations. I.Mainstreameclecticism Fewinthelegalacademywoulddisputethatlegaltheoryhasbecomemoresophisticated and the methods of legal scholarship more eclectic since the interwar era of "legal realism". Realism set in motion changes which have defined the post-war generation of legal mainstream academics and which have highlighted the relationships between law andotherdisciplines.Onestrikingmanifestationofthisdevelopmentisthatonecanhardly peruse a law journal without encountering references to what once seemed the obscure textsofdivergentdisciplines,forinterdisciplinarynourishmenthasbecomeastaplepartof thepost-realistmainstream. Most agree that the realists left legal scholarship in a real quandary. One way to think about realism's legacy for North American legal scholarship is to focus on two scholarly inquiries which have seemed, since realism, increasingly difficult to pursue. First, what makeslawspecial,independent,autonomous?Second,whatgiveslawitsforce,orbite,or connectiontosociallife?Therealists,bydemonstratingthemutualimplicationoflawand political or social life, made it more difficult to account for law's autonomy. At the same time, their insights into the extremely flexible relationship between given legal propositions and particular social relations made it more difficult to explain law's normative bite. Thinking about realism in this way, as a simultaneous challenge to the independence and force of law, illuminates the post-realist's difficult relationship to the worlds of both thought and power. In short, the mainstream legal scholar repeats in his uneasy relationship to both other disciplines and to politics his anxiety about the independenceandauthorityoflaw-andthelegalacademic. Astherealists'insightshavebeendevelopedoverthepastdecades,becomingevermore culturally pervasive, legal theory and doctrine have come to seem weaker and less persuasive. Doctrinal argument seems increasingly complex and ever less able to determine outcomes. The normative moorings of the most basic doctrinal discourse by lawyers, scholars and judges seem infirm. Legal principles, rules and policy arguments seem to dissolve far too easily into thin disguises for assertions of interest. The more diversethesphereofanargument'sapplication,thethinneritseemstobecomeuntilits manipulabilitybecomesmoreapparentthanitspersuasiveclout.Theresulthasbeenever more polarized arguments, ever more sophisticated doctrinal diversity, and ever more narrowlyapplicableholdings.
At the same time, legal theory seems both bogged down in controversy and increasingly irrelevant to the work of legal practice. Descriptions and analyses of doctrinal developments have been unable to explain the unstructured and diverse nature of contemporarylawwithouteitherabandoningtheideaofanormativelaworlimitingthe ambitofnormativeclaimstoafewfairlynarrowcases.Theoreticianshavebeenunableto describewhatgoesoninpost-realistlegalculturewithoutchoosingbetweenadefenseof law's normative claims which abandons a great deal of the field occupied by lawyers to politics and a defense of law's scope which abandons claims about its special normative status. Bluntly put, after realism, there was no generally accepted sense in the American legal academy about what makes law distinctive and how law can be stably linked to social behavior. But these remained the questions. Far from becoming discouraged, legal scholars seemed to become obsessed with figuring out what law is and what gives law normativestability.Andtherewerenearlyasmanyanswersastherewerelegalscholars. Moreover, faced with the growing fragmentation of legal theory and doctrine, lawyers scavenged in foreign disciplines, rushing to the bookstore to shore up their own edifice. Thishasworkedinacoupleofdifferentways,inpartdependinguponthequestionwhich seemed most pressing. Sometimes, particularly when focusing on the question of law's stablebite,disciplinessuchassociology,history,politicalscienceandeconomicshavebeen used to provide a structured (even a legally structured) base for or alternative to the increasing fragmentation of the law. This approach makes it difficult to explain law's distinctiveness.Typically,thescholartriestoaccountforlaw'sidentitybyclaimingthatthe thingslegalpeopledoare,orarestructuredby,orcontributeto,alegalprocess-foreven ifeverythingispolitical,itisnot,afterall,justpolitics.Thisverypractical,practiceoriented approach, threatens to be very uncritical. In an extreme form, it tends towards the tautological-law,howeverlikeeverythingelseitseems,istherealmofthelegal. Ontheotherhand,particularlywhentheissueoflaw'sautonomyseemedmostpressing, mainstreamscholarshavereliedondisciplinessuchasphilosophy,moraltheoryorliterary theory to assert that law exists and works when it is good, followed and understood. Needlesstosay,thisinternalfocusonlegalculture-evenlawasculture-makesitdifficult toexplainlaw'sauthorityorstablebiteandseemsequallypronetothetautological.But wealreadyseeanimportantstructure.Otherdisciplinesareinvitedintolegalscholarship toresolvedifferentquestions-questionswhichtogether,whenposedsimultaneouslyto thesamediscipline,seemimpossibletoanswer.Theresultisanodddivisionofintellectual labor-forlaw'sindependence,seephilosophy,forlaw'sauthority,seepoliticalscience. Either of these strategies alone, of course, would merely restate the problem posed by realism:howtoaccountforlaw'sscopewithoutreducingitspowerinacultureskepticalof both natural law and science. But the particulars of these strategies are less important thanthecollectiveimpressiontheyleave.Suddenlyfragmentationisavirtueratherthana G e r m a n L a w J o u r n a l vice. And post-realist legal scholars have responded to the doubts raised by realism with eclectic proliferation: more articles, more references, more diverse arguments, drawing simultaneouslyonasmanydisciplinesaspossible. Theirstrengthcomesnotsolelyfromthesheerweightoftheiroutput,however,butfrom theshrewdshuttleplaybetweenskepticismandreconstructionwhichthisinterdisciplinary profusion makes possible. Neither an economic/political account of a legal process enmeshed in a world of interests nor a philosophical/moral account of legal teleology isolatedinaworldoftransactionsisverysatisfying.Butmaneuveringbetweenthem,and restatingtheirdifferenceinathousandsubtlenooksandcranniesismorethansatisfyingitisaproductivescholarlyindustry. Despite this strength, however, it is easy to imagine how a proliferation of complexly strategized ambiguity and paradox about law's relationship to the human and social sciencesmightmakemainstreamlegalacademicsuneasy.Atafirstlevel,itiseasytosee thatrelianceuponpoliticalscienceormoralphilosophyseemsunlikelytorespondtorealist fueleddisintegration.Afterall,itwasinsightsabouttheunavoidableimplicationofpolitics andmoralityinthelawwhichfueledlegalrealisminthefirstplace.Itseemsunlikelythat distinctionswhichareobviouslyunworkablewithinlegalculturewillproveverysatisfying whentransformedintoboundariesbetweenlawanditssisterdisciplines. Nevertheless, this interdisciplinary strategy has a familiar and persuasive structuredenyingabroadwhatweknowtobetrueathome.Referencetoforeigndisciplinesallows ustoforgetourrealism-realismisourproblem,adirtylittlesecret.Atthesametime,this strategyisplaguedbyafamiliaruneasiness.Whatiftheyfindout?Whatiftheirdisciplines arenomorefirmlystructuredthanourown?Andanyway,isn'titourrealismthatmakes usspecial,sophisticated,shrewd?Despitehisaspirationtotranscendrealismbyroaming thelibrary,themainstreamlegalscholarfindshimselfnaggedbyitsshadow. Moreover,thisshadowbecameevermoreprominent,formainstreamlegalscholarswere quick to deploy the insights of realism against one another. If the practice of scholarly elaborationwasthesuppressionofrealismbeneatheclecticinterdisciplinarypromises,the practice of academic criticism came to be the deployment of realist insights against preciselysuchreconstructions.Asoneafteranotherhumansciencewasdeployedinlegal scholarship, criticism extended and deepened realism's shadow, fueling the very fragmentationallthisproductionsoughttocalm.Slowly,everypost-realistcametoseem thelasthonestman,untaintedbyfragmentation.Ijudge,thereforeIam. Buttheuneasinessofmainstreamlegalscholarsaboutinterdisciplinaryworkhasanother, more personal source. Exactly as fragmentation heightened each scholar's isolation, the solidity of his professional identity was coming unstuck. The more they retooled the less abletheyseemedtocommunicatewithoneanother.Moreover,beinganinterdisciplinary traveler exacts a toll. Traversing foreign terrain -whether as a legal comparativist or methodologicaleclectic-istroublinginacoupleofways.Ifundertakentoenrichthelaw, the project threatens the scholar's loyalty to his own discipline. One ponders the advantages of going native, renouncing professional fealty, becoming an historian, economist,philosopher. Totheextentthescholarremainsloyaltothelaw,heworriesboththathewillneverfully enterandunderstandtheforeigndisciplineandthathisattachmenttoitwillrenderhim professionallymarginal,dependentuponthefickleimporttradeinfunctionallyapplicable insights. How long will legal scholars find psychiatry fascinating? Aren't they already beginning to prefer sociology? In this sense the eclectic seems actually to relive law's uneasinessaboutitsrelationshiptotherestoflife,enactingthetheoreticaldoubtswhich realismgeneratedandwhichhiseclecticismismeanttoaddress. Despite these difficulties, post realist legal culture seems by and large to have been sustained rather than sabotaged by their complex relationship to the world of ideas. Although it seems that the eclectic might be consumed, professionally and theoretically torn apart, by the doubts which law raises about intellectual culture and which interdisciplinaryroamingraisesaboutlegalculture,ithasnotworkedoutthisway.Instead, post-realistlegalscholarshavemarkedtheirdifferencefromrealism-theirdistancefrom itsdisintegratinginsights-intheirdistinctivemanagementofinterdisciplinaryroaming. Letmepauseforamomentonthisnotionofmanagement,foritseemsthesecretofmuch contemporary legal work. My sense is of a scholarly community, perhaps an industry, sustained not by a shared sense of problems to be addressed or criteria for evaluating resolution, but rather by a collective practice of shrewd equivocation, by which every attempt at problem definition or resolution is transformed into a process, perhaps an institution,ofevocation,deferralandrepetition.Interdisciplinaryroamingseemsbutone exampleofthispractice,anexamplewhichinstitutionalizesthelegalacademic'sunsettled sensibilityaboutideas. Atypicalpost-realistworkoflegalscholarshipmightreferthereaderseekingauthorityand resolution for thorny problems to the worlds of practice (known by sociology), judicial decision (known by literary interpretation and linguistics), legislative fiat (known by political science), moral judgment (known by philosophy), business practice (known by empirical study) or market efficiency (known by economics). The key to such referrals is their solidity. The realm to which reference is made is projected far more stably than it mightappeartoscholarstillingitsfields.Thus,theinsistentcallforcarefulempiricalstudy or philosophical reflection imagines a stable practice known only as a hope -just as nostalgia for a once and future business judgment, market efficiency or procedural imperativeinvokesameaningfulnesssustainableonlyasamemory. Forthistowork,theimportsmustbecrude-mustcompensateforthesophisticationof therealist'scritiqueoflaw'sindependenceandauthority.Itisdifficultatfirsttoseehow G e r m a n L a w J o u r n a l suchcrudeimportedreferencescoulddothejob-especiallyinthefaceofshrewdcollegial critique. One partial explanation might be provided by the mainstream post-realist's relationship to his own practice, for the typical post-realist legal scholar devotes a significant part of his time to the "practice" of generating imperatives of the sort he can invokeinhisscholarlywork. He might work with the profession, codifying, restating and cataloging norms, with the professional representing the judgments of business, with the poor, experiencing the imperativesofpolitics,orwiththegovernment,developingthenecessitiesofinstitutional process.Orhemightworkwiththesociologistsdoingempiricalwork,withtheeconomists generatingandtestingmodels,andsoforth.Whateverhedoeswhenheisnotteachingor writingheremembersinhisscholarshipmorenobly,moreinsistently,moreclearly,more hopefully,thanheadmitsinconversation.Thuswemightthinkofthepostrealistscholar writing about doctrine this way: suddenly, if repeatedly, he stumbles on difficulties of fragmentation, undecidability and uncertainty, and he invokes another discipline, remembering-himself,onanotherday,inanothermood,steadfast. In this way, the interdisciplinary practice and scholarship of the typical post-realist reinforce one another. The sophistication of the practice -its imbedded uncertainty -is buttressed by the clarity of the scholarly narrative. If the practice seems crude, the scholarship is tenuous, delicate, finely nuanced and open-ended. When the scholarship seems fragmented, it remembers the practice, and so on. All these references back and forth across the boundary between thinking and doing, between a rejection and a transcendence of intellection, when things go right, give post-realist work a positive forwardspin. It is important to realize, however, that it is the work, the judgment, which seems authoritative, confident. The mainstream legal scholar himself seems lost. For all the elaborate self-reference of much post-realist legal writing, this delicate textual management is usually marked by a distinctively self-effacing tone and purport. Interdisciplinarytravelshaveerodedtheassertivenessofthelegalwriter-hiswillingness tospeakastheembodimentofaself-confidentlegalculture.Conflictsaboutidentityand loyalty do that -and in any case some such erosion seems to have sparked the flight to foreign terrain in the first place. As a result, the modern legal voice is strangely flat and disembodied -assertive only about its humility and the difficulty of its enterprise. The unsatisfactorynatureofeachinterdisciplinarymovementisdeployedtosuggestthenext. Inthis,themainstreameclecticseemstohavesavedhisfieldonlybylosinghisvoice.
II.Themainstreamcritic
Beforeturningtoscholars-suchasthoseassociatedwithCLSorlawandeconomics-who situatethemselvesagainstthemainstream,itisimportanttofocusontheextenttowhich themainstreamlegalscholarpursuesacriticalprojectdespitethefactthattheeclecticism ofmodernlegalscholarshipseemsprimarilyadefenseoflawagainstthedisintegrationset inmotionbytherealists.Indeed,thepost-realistseemsasdeterminedtoextendrealism's critical project as he is to respond to it. His difficulty is that the product of his eclectic construction is extremely difficult to undo. Shrewdly equivocal and passionately disengaged, the mainstream discourse of contemporary law is infuriatingly difficult to criticize. It is hardly surprising that the post-realist would be as rigorous in pillaging the terrainofmodernthoughtforatellingcriticalvantagepointashewasinthesearchfora workable,iftemporary,Archimedeanpoint. Occasionallythepost-realistproducesanarticlewhichseemswhollycriticalintone.More often, however, his criticism is woven subtly into an argument which is predominantly constructive in aim and tone. He criticizes other post-realists or dismisses propositions which lie outside or challenge his own reconstructive agenda in one way or another. He deploys criticism to clear the ground for his own reimaginative project. Although an integral part of the post-realist enterprise, however, this criticism seems uneasily restrained.Post-realistworktypicallyrelatestocriticismmuchasitrelatestointellection, managing and absorbing criticism -assertively, hesitantly, tentatively, at times almost flirtatiously. One way to sort out this complicated interchange between reconstruction and criticism (or, if you prefer, between the rebuke and the revival of realism) in mainstream postrealistlegalscholarshipistofocusontheoscillationwithinthesetextsbetweennormand deed,theoryandpractice,prescriptionanddescription.Thisrelationshipistellingbecause the post-realist repeats in his scholarly differentiation of theory and practice his anxiety abouthisidentityaslawandhisdifferencefromintellection-orhisforceasjudgment. Letmepausehereonthisnotionofrepetition.Mysenseisthattodevelopapictureofthe post-realist, a picture which can stabilize his shifting identity and uncertainty about thought,wemighttraceasetofrelationswhichmirrorourscholar'srelationshiptoideas. Even as the post-realist fudges the boundary between law and other disciplines, we find himemphasizingtherelationshipsbetweenlegalpracticeandlegalscholarship,theoryand doctrine,thelegalsub-culturesofobjectiveandsubjectivelegalcultures,andsoon.Iwant to dwell for a moment on the relationship between two distinctions which loom large in thepost-realistimagination-betweentheoryanddoctrineontheonehand,andcriticism andconstructionontheother-toillustratemysenseofrepetition.Inseems,moreover, thattherelationshipbetweenthesedistinctionsismanagedbymaneuveringtheboundary betweenlawandotherdisciplines. First, the distinction between theory and doctrine. Mainstream scholars seem to retain faithintheseverabilityofdoctrinalandtheoreticaltasks,usuallyseekingfirsttoelaborate thesystemofnormsandthentoanalyzethenormativesystemwhichtheyhavecreated. They speak with two voices, imagining themselves as both creator and consumer of the legal fabric. In "doing theory" they compare conceptions of law for their descriptive and prescriptive fit with the legal world -a comparison informed by various interdisciplinary images of that world. In doctrinal work, by contrast, they elaborate norms to cover new cases, clarify the interpretation of past situations and construct arguments to resolve contemporarydisputes-againinformedbyavarietyofextralegalmethodsandinsights. The post-realist pursues this double agenda partly out of a sense that legal theory and doctrine are richly textured and quasi-independent realms. The "quasi-independence" of theory and doctrine expresses their sense that something about the performance of one seemstoprecludetheperformanceoftheother.Thoseengagedintheelaborationoflegal rules and standards could be either descriptive or imaginative, but in either case, they seem unable to search simultaneously for the source or justification of the law they propound. In order to elaborate legal rules, to separate law and not law, one must first understandthedifferencebetweenlegalnormsandotherbehavioralpatterns.Thatmuch seemsinherentinthedefinitionofelaboration. Likewise,topracticethescholarshipofjustifyingorexplainingtheresultingsystemoflaws fromtheremoveofatheoreticalperspective,onemustbeginwithavisionofthecorpusof lawwhichneedsexplanationorjustification.Thatmuchseemsrequiredbythenatureof justification.Thescholarmaypracticeeitherelaborationorexplanation,maycombinethe twoinasinglearticle,mayrecognizethatinsomewayeachrequirestheotherorthateach aloneisunsatisfactory,butcannotperformbothsimultaneously.Thesetasksrequireand precludeeachother. Thissenseofthequasi-independenceoftheoryanddoctrinethusnotonlymotivatesthe doubleagendaofthepostrealistscholar-itsimultaneouslymakesthatagendaextremely difficulttofulfill.Theablepost-realistsquaresthiscirclebyshuttlingacrosstheboundaries betweenlawandotherdisciplinesandbetweencriticismandconstruction. To suggest how this might work, let me sketch two broad schemes of interdisciplinary importationtypicalofpost-realistscholarship.Ontheonehand,wefindformal,analytical methods of analysis similar to the objective logic of the empirical sciences -but also familiar from analytic philosophy. On the other, we find intuitive, idealistic or moralistic methodsofanalysissimilartothoseusedinaestheticsorart.Theinvocationof"politics" might take either form -as an imperative, even factual science or as a realm of artistic discretion. Normally, the constructive doctrinal work of the post-realist employs the more objective methodology.Intheconstructiveprojectofdoctrinalelaborationwetypicallyfindthelogic of empiricism and formalism. Normally, by contrast, the post-realist undertakes his constructivetheoreticalworkwiththetoolsofintuitionandaesthetics.
Ofcourse,thisassociationofmethodsandrealmsofworkisnotfixedintheconstructive workofmainstreamscholars.Onefindsalsoconstructivedoctrinalworkwhichisinspired by elegance or idealism and scholars whose theoretical work is rigorously analytical. Yet, although the associations of the two methodologies with theory and doctrine might be reversed, these distinctions mark the difference between theory and doctrine in the constructivework. Post-realist criticism, on the other hand, often achieves its bite by reversing these associations.Doctrinalformulationswhichhadbeenformallyelaboratedarecriticizedfor their moral bankruptcy. Theoretical elaborations which were idealistic are criticized as logically or empirically or analytically unsound. A thoroughgoing reform-minded mainstreamerwillexploitbothoftheseaspectsofconstructivescholarshiptodevelophis criticism. Just as constructive scholarship uses analytic methods to develop theory and aestheticmethodstoelaboratedoctrine,soreformersoftenreversetheirmethodologyin response. So long as the fundamental division between analytics and aesthetics is maintained, scholarship can be both constructive and critical. Yet as long as analytics and aesthetics remaindistinct,legalscholarshipcannotbeconstructiveandcriticalatthesametimeorin the same voice. Only a shifting identity can sustain the omnibus project of critique and construction. And a shifting identity only seems sustainable so long as aesthetics and analyticsremaincompatible-witheachotherasmuchaswithlaw.Butthisdoesnotseem possibleforlong.Indeed,thepost-realist'sbasicexperienceofempiricismisitscontentless generality, its obliteration of meaning, just as his basic experience of morality is its groundlessindividuality. We might summarize the mechanism by which the post-realist elides this dilemma by saying that mainstream scholarship works by displacing into the difference between alternativedisciplines(scienceandmorality)adistinctionwhichitseekstoblurwithinthe law itself (doctrine and theory). The movement occurs through the juxtaposition of constructiveandcriticalvoicesinthepost-realisttext. As a result, mainstream scholarship, although inspired by realist insights into the inseparability of law and life or of theory and doctrine and often inspired by literatures fromotherdisciplineswhichcriticizethesedistinctions,repeatthemintheirownwork.Itis arepetitiontheydevelopasarelationamonginterdisciplinaryalternatives.Theymightuse historytoattacklaw'sidealistclaimsandlogictodemonstratethatlaw'spurportedscope isunsustainableandthenturntofunctionalsociologytoelaboratelaw'sactualterrainand analytic philosophy to sustain law's normative claims. And so on. No less a figure than Justice Benjamin Cardozo put it this way: "History or custom or social utility or some compelling sense of justice or sometimes perhaps a semi-intuitive apprehension of the pervading spirit of our law must come to the rescue of the anxious judge and tell him wheretogo".
Theresultisaninterminablediscussioninflightfromtheclosureitseeks.Inrepeatingthis distinction,whileembracingtheverygroundfromwhichitmightberenderedvisible,the mainstream avoids direct inquiry into either their knowledge or their activity, recreating each by reference to the absent other. The play of references which results might seem either incoherent, alienating and generally unpleasant, or inescapable, necessary and desirable.Howeveronefeelsaboutit,themostsignificantaccomplishmentofmainstream scholarshipispreciselythisuneasyinterminability. Asaresult,mainstreamworkplaceslawanditsintellectualotheraswellastheenterprises of criticism and reconstruction in complicated relationships of interdependence. This embrace-evendependenceupon-theintellectionandcriticismwhichthreatensthelaw theywoulddefendistheirshrewdestachievementandaboldexpressionoftheircomplex relationshiptotherealistscholarshipwhichtheyseemtohavedisplacedbysimultaneous affirmationanddenial. III.Thecriticallegalscholar LetmeturnnowtotheCLSmovement,like"lawandeconomics",aself-consciousscholarly oppositiontomainstreampost-realismwhichemergedslowlyduringtheseventies.Inthis description of CLS, I am less concerned with the nuance of their arguments, with their historicalspecificity,withthesubstantiveclaimstheyhaveadvancedinparticularareas,or with their methodological claims than I am with their relationship to the mainstream problematicoflawandintellection.Itishere,morethaninanyspecificinsightoradvance, thatCLSshowsbothitsoppositiontothemainstreamanditssituationwithinmainstream Americanlegalculture. TheCLSmovementseemstohavebeeninitiatedatleastpartlybyscholarsworkingwithin themainstreamwhowantedtoemphasizethevariouscriticalstrandsofpost-realistwork. CLSscholarshipbecamedistinctivewhenitbegantotacklemoredirectlythecomplacency of eclectic mainstream liberalism in both its constructive and critical phases. To do so, criticallegalscholars,liketheireclectictarget,turnedtointellectualtraditionsdeveloped elsewhere.Theworkwhichhasresultedpursuesawidevarietyofcriticalstrategies.Letme beginwithsomegeneralremarksabouttheinterdisciplinarypredilectionsofCLSandthen focusforamomentontwoEuropeanintellectualtraditionswhichhavebeenparticularly influential:criticaltheoryandstructuralism. To an extent critical legal scholars simply assert the authority of alternative disciplines, preferringphilosophytosociology,continentaltoanalyticphilosophyandsoforth.Partly they recast the assertions of mainstream scholars as doubts, reversing the relationship between theory and practice, law and politics, prescription and description, construction andcriticisminmainstreamlegalscholarship.Partlytheytakemainstreamclaimsoneata time, severing them from their fluid interrelationship with their negation in mainstream work, and extend them seriously until they succeed or collapse. Thus, the CLS scholar might both assert that although law and politics are, as the mainstream maintains, interdependent, politics predominates and that legal doctrine, argument and history should be analyzed autonomously, stripped of any post-realist "policy" or "sociological" explanation.Thisaccountmightbeintroducedbyalengthyfootnotetovariouscontinental philosophers. To the extent CLS work has heightened critical tendencies in mainstream work, CLS scholarship has remained as methodologically eclectic as that of the mainstream.Intheirownway,theyrestate,evenexaggerate,boththeindependenceand theauthorityoflegalculture.Andthesecriticshavebeenabletoclaimbothtohavetaken interdisciplinary work more seriously than the mainstream and to have refused eclectic apologyinfavorofareturntothetraditionaltextsofthelaw;tohaveresurrectedrealism where the mainstream rejected its insights and to have refused realism's idealism or empiricism or skepticism where the mainstream extended the realist's departure from legal doctrine and theory; to have both rejected and inherited the "law and society" literatureofthesixtiesandseventies. LetmepauseforamomenttoconsiderthesimilaritybetweenCLSandmainstreamwork on this count. This common eclectic diversity distinguishes both groups somewhat from the work of law and economics, and makes it more difficult to understand the sense in whichCLSisunderstoodasachallenge,evenanaffront,tothemainstream.Indeed,atthis level, the law and economics movement seemed a far more promising strategy if radical separationfromthemainstreamwerethegoal. Earlylawandeconomicswasfarmoreuniform,andfarmoredismissiveofthemainstream method and problematic. Although the problem posed by the mainstream remained central, law and economics, especially at its most exuberant moments, claimed -in a telling repudiation of the mainstream's careful equivocation -to have found an answer. Gone was the hesitation about method, the uneasiness about both abstract models and direct empiricism, the tortured individual judgments about the requirements of legal culture.Initsplacewasawholesaledeparturetothedisciplineofaforeigndiscipline. Early CLS work, by contrast, continued the mainstream's eclectic method and seemed to rejectonlytheapparentobjectofnormallegalscience-theimageofafinalresolutionto doctrinalquandary.Theapproachremaineduneasyaboutotherdisciplines,abouttheory, aboutpracticeandabouteverythingexcepttheinternalworkingsoflegalscholarshipitself. If we think ofthemainstream asthevoiceofmodernism inlegalculture, it waslawand economicswhichbrokefirstandmostresolutelyfromitsfragmentedvoice.Andyetitwas thechallengeposedbycriticallegalstudies'similaritywhichseemedmostthreateningto mainstream sensibility, as if they remained more attached to an unrealized program of completionorfinalitythantothemechanicsandintegrityoftheirownthought. In another way, however, these two schools seem simply to have taken different roads away from the mainstream's unease about intellection to conspicuous erudition. For law G e r m a n L a w J o u r n a l and economics, the road to rebellion seemed a radical completion of the mainstream's program, whatever the methodological consequences. If you want to resolve these agonizingdifficulties,tobefreeofyouranxiousindecision,theyseemedtosay,watchthis. CLS,ontheotherhand,sidesteppedtheprogramtopursueitsrebellioninthelexiconofa radical completion of the mainstream's method. They seemed to proceed through intellectualsophistication,eclecticelisionoruneasinessaboutpractice-andouttheother side. FortheCLSscholar,intellectualeclecticismisastroublingasithasbeenforhismainstream counterpart. No more than the mainstream scholar ishe ableto beconfidenton foreign terrain except to the extent he replaces mainstream hesitancy about theory with conspicuous erudition. But just as the mainstreamer's critical demand for intellection intruded on his legal autonomy, so the critic's desire to take seriously doctrine's autonomous claims threatens his intellection. Moreover, the CLS scholar remains a legal academic,grippedbytheprofession'sparadoxicalrelationshiptootherdisciplines.Tothe extent the CLS scholar recapitulates the mainstream movement between law and life, theory and doctrine, criticism and construction, he also feels each term's attack on the pretenseoftheother. The parallel structure of CLS scholarship is expressed by its relationship to certain extralegalphilosophicliteratures.LetmetaketwoEuropeanintellectualtraditionswhichhave been particularly influential in CLS work as examples: critical theory and structuralism. Althoughmostrecentinterdisciplinaryforaginghascontinuedratherthanquestionedthe tendency to oscillate between complementary forms of theoretical and doctrinal work, critical legal scholars who have become convinced that the problem is a failure to relinquish the distinction between theory and practice have turned to literatures which takeastheirstartingpointarejectionofthisdisjuncture.Likethoseinthemainstreamwho have begun deploying notions gleaned from literature which recognizes these difficulties (most notably the traditions of hermeneutics and literary criticism), this interdisciplinary maneuver has more often repeated than resolved or rejected the difficulties which motivatedit. The first wave of CLS scholars hoping to escape the mutual embrace of mainstream criticism and apology often relied on what they took to be the continental traditions of critical theoryand structuralism.Theinvocationof theseparticular traditionssignaled an ambitiontorefusepost-realistmodestyandeclecticism-atleasttotheextentitseemed anti-intellectual. That signal was sent partly by the obscurity and novelty of relying upon suchremotehighculturaltexts-byseizingtheintellectualhighground.Partlyitwassent throughthevaguelyreceivedsensethatthesetwotraditionswere"about"gettingoutof the theory/practice circle. These messages seem much more important than any "application" of these traditions in critical legal scholarship. Indeed, the very offhand quality of their invocation (often reduced to a self-effacing string-cite in a first footnote) mockedtheideaofmethodologicalapplicationorinterdisciplinaryimportationevenasit seized the intellectual high ground. If atypical of scholars importing any particular nonlegal intellectual tradition, this mockery was quite consistent with the mainstream's general uneasiness about association with the complexities of "fancy theory". These two traditions, however, were associated with rather specific methodological projectsprojects which restated in an odd way the difficulties of post-realist scholarship. Critical theorywasunderstoodtoproceedfromtherelationshipbetweenattemptsbyHegeland Marx to locate the source of the dichotomy between object and subject in history or to locate the identical subject/object of history which would transcend the antinomies of traditionalphilosophyandthealienationofbourgeoislife.Asoneafteranotherproposed historical subject failed to fulfill this role, critical theory developed a rich literature of explanation,critiquingthesocialmechanismswhicharethoughttoreproducealienation. Each critique was supplemented by a relocation of the aspiration for liberation. Brought into law, this theoretical enterprise became associated with a dialectical historical revisionism and a series of increasingly formulaic excuses for continued injusticesupplementedbyaheroicinvocationofpractice. Structuralism, on the other hand, was understood to have begun by suspending the questionofhistoricalorigin,separatingthefluidpresentmomentfromthetextofitspast and future. This suspension of the search for historical transcendence permitted an elaborateseriesofexplorationsintotherelationalnatureofmeaning.Buttheseanalyses were always supplemented by shadow theories of the origin of the social relations or structureswhichtheyanalyzed.BroughtintolawbyCLSscholars,thisforeignmethodwas oftenstrippedofthesesupplementalassumptions,leadingtodesiccatedanalysesofform -supplementedbyaheroicinvocationoftheory. Atleastinthiscrudetendentialform,thedifferencebetweenthesetwoEuropeanimports seems to repeat the difference within the mainstream between practice and theory. Criticaltheoryistopracticeasstructuralismistotheory.Assoofteninmainstreamwork we find a difficulty handled by projection onto a difference among imported intellectual traditions-evenifthatprojectiondemandsareductioninthesophisticationofthetrends itimports.Theoverallimpressionismoreimportantthantheparticulars-allthebasesare covered. Indeed, individual works of critical legal scholarship often surround a dense structural analysis of doctrine with an introduction and conclusion in the style of critical theory-suggestingthat"legitimation"or"falseconsciousness"orwhateverprovidesalink betweenthelimitsofformandtheimpossibilityofhistory. For all this repetition, however, these traditions seem shrewd choices, for each is more complicated than that. If challenged on the reductions necessary for the project as a whole,theCLSscholarcaneasilybeefuphisimportedliterature.Criticaltheoryseemsto worry about nothing so much as its reliance on a historical subject, and structuralism seemspreoccupiedpreciselywithavoidingthemechanicsofform.G e r m a n L a w J o u r n a l Moreover, both disciplines sought to dislodge the complacent everyday perception of reality. They shared the conviction that the paradigmatic interpretation which underlies the most prosaic of observations has an anesthetizing and alienating effect upon those who hold it, which can be overcome only through a traumatic reinterpretation of reality whichchangestheworldfortheobserver.ThiscommondimensionfitnicelywiththeCLS demandforextra-legalassistanceintheprojectofrefusingmainstreamlegalscholarship. My sense is of an import trade which worked at two levels. First, a rather crude use: of structuralism to complete, pursue or radicalize the mainstream project of doctrinal elaboration and construction, and of critical theory to complete, pursue or radicalize the mainstream project of positioned, perhaps historical, critique. Second, a more sophisticateduse:ofstructuralismtodefendtheimpossibilityofformalelaborationandof criticaltheorytodefendtheimpossibilityofcontextualground. Thus, we find an interesting and crucial reversal of the mainstreamer's sense of the sophisticationoflawandthecrudenessofinterdisciplinaryborrowings.Suddenly,thinking is sophisticated and law is crude. And the mainstream self-assertion as legal judgment, howevereffaced,hasbecometheself-assertionoftheCLSintellectual-ifyoulike,amove from knowledge to power. This rather contradictory rhetorical deployment proved for a long period an unassailable combination, challenging the mainstream even as it recapitulated, even deepened and honored, the mainstream's interdisciplinary method andeclecticrhetoricalstyle. But this recapitulation has proved troubling. I have said that in a certain sense, the disciplinesofcriticaltheoryandstructuralismmerelyrestatethetheory/practiceproblem fromwhichthecriticallegalscholarsoughtrelief.Andindeed,foralltheirequivocation,in thefinalanalysis,itseemsthat,asimportedintolegalscholarship,criticaltheoryhasstood for the valorization of a posited transcendental subject, just as structuralism, has encouraged the tendency to posit an origin for autonomously investigable doctrinal activity. As a result, neither critical theory nor structuralism has provided a "method" whichlawyerscan"deploy"againsttheirtheoreticalanddoctrinalmalaise.Althoughuseful in establishing a stance against mainstream scholarship, they have not proved able to sustainalongtermprojectofcriticalanalysis. Instead, much critical legal scholarship has simply oscillated between assertions of doctrinalindeterminacysustainedbyasocialtheoryandinvocationsofsocialspontaneity sustainedbymechanicaldoctrinalorrhetoricalmaneuver.Itislittlewonder,then,thatCLS importation of these critical artifacts of high culture should mimic the uneasiness of mainstreameclecticism-thatthereferenceshouldbeinthesimultaneouslyarrogantand effacingfirstfootnote,forexample. BecausetheCLSscholarreplicatestheeclecticinconsistencyofmainstreamwork,hetoo must struggle to ground his fluid maneuver somewhere. Despite his affirmation and recapitulation of much of legal culture, the CLS scholar often finds this ground is his relation of opposition to the parallel eclecticism of mainstream work. But in doing so he acknowledges his relationship to that work, permitting the mainstreamer to resolve his dilemmabystandingfirmlyforthedefense,despitehisownwillingnesstocriticize. Inthis,wemightthinkofCLSashavinginitiatedarepetitionwithinlegalculture-between thecritsandthemainstream-ofadifferencemainstreamersexperiencedasarelationship topracticeandtheoryorbetweendisciplinessuitableforimportation.Anditshouldcome asnosurprisethatmanyofthedebatesbetweenmainstreamandcriticallegalscholarship taketheformofargumentaboutwho,forbetterorworse,ismoretheoretical,intellectual, engaged,andsoon. Thus, perhaps somewhat paradoxically, we find the radical extension of the uneasy reliance upon foreign disciplines intensifying the internal flavor of legal scholarship. This turninward,orlossoffaithinthestabilityofthealwaysuneasyrelationshipbetweenlaw and the realms of thought has a couple of important consequences. First, it puts a great deal more pressure on the relationship between legal culture and the world of politics, practiceandaction-arelationshipwhichIwilldiscussinmoredetailinthesecondpartof thisessay.Atthisstage,sufficeittosaythatthisismostdefinitelynottheproblematicof lawandeconomics.Havingpursuedafarmoreaggressivemethodologicaltransformation, theyseemuntroubledbyanxietyabouttherelationshipbetweentheoreticalmodelsand doctrinalpractice. Second, and perhaps more importantly, this systematic disciplinary internalization of the relationship between law and thought models what was perhaps critical legal studies' single most important scholarly contribution -and one which would be repeated and extended as CLS developed. The central contemporary reorientation of the relationship betweenlawandpolitics-theclaimthatlawisarestatementofitsimaginaryrelationship tosociety-hasbeendevelopedbybringingthemargin(society-politics-economy)into thecoreoflaw,ratherthanbytryingtostabilizeandrelateonetotheother.Itwasthis change which marked the difference between the "law and society" movement of the sixties and seventies and CLS. A great deal of CLS work has been preoccupied with this maneuver, documenting within the corpus of legal doctrine or the structures of legal historicalchangedistinctions-betweenpublicandprivate,objectiveandsubjective,etc.-which model the anxious and uncertain relationship law imagines itself to have with the restofsociallife. Asnapshotofthelegalacademyafterthecollapseofthelawandsocietymovement,after the proliferation of post-realist apology and critique, and after the institutionalization of CLS,wouldconsequentlyrevealacomplexsetofmutualdependenciesandrecapitulations. Such a snapshot would capture a set of relations marked by shifts in emphasis and by changesinextradisciplinaryfocus.Initwewouldseerealismrecapitulatedandrejectedby the mainstream, the mainstream recapitulating within itself its own paradoxical relationshipofdefenseandcriticismtorealism,andfinallyCLSalternativelyrecapitulating and rejecting both realism and the mainstream. Each of these turns would be marked in partbychangingrelationshipstotheworldofideasoutsidethedisciplineoflaw.
IV.CLS-asecondlook:thepost-modernlegalscholar
It is perhaps too early to begin documenting developments within CLS. In a most preliminary way, however, it does seem that something about the tone and style of CLS workhaschangedoverthepastdecade,particularlyasyoungerscholars,manytrainedat least partly by CLS teachers, have begun producing scholarship of their own. For our purposes,itissignificantthatthissecondwavehasmarkeditsdifferencefromearlierCLS workinpartbyashiftininterdisciplinaryallegiance-turningnowtoextra-legalliteratures whichthemselvesrespondedtothestructuralistandneo-Marxisttextsrelieduponbythe firstgenerationofcriticallegalscholarship. By 1980, the rotation of academic generations in the legal academy had sped up, each markedbyanaffiliationwithanewsetofextra-disciplinaryreadingsandauthorities.These generationaldepartures,likethemovefromthemainstreamtoCLS,havebeenmotivated both intellectually and institutionally. The institutional demand for scholarly production andinnovationremaintellingdespitewhathaveseemedthedramaticdeparturesfromthe mainstreamexecutedbylawandeconomicsandCLS.Itnowseemspossibletocarryout thatinnovativeproductionwithintheirlexicons.
To an extent, this body of work has simply amplified individual insights rooted in earlier CLSwork.Sometimes,forexample,theopennessofthedoctrinalfabric,assertedbyCLSas arealistinheritance,hasbeenpursuedwithrenewedvigorandtheoreticalsophisticationandsinglemindedness,cutloosefromitscomplicatedparticipationinamorestableimage ofthelegalprocess.Thisworkhasalsocontinuedanddeepenedthestructuralcritiqueof doctrine by fleshing out particular recurring rhetorical forms, such as the relationship betweenrulesandexceptions,inmainstreamwork. Atthesametime,thislaterworkhasshiftedemphasissomewhat.Thesearchforhistorical contexthasbeenpartlydisplacedbyaninterestintheprocessesoftextualdevelopment. JustasCLSsetasidethemainstreamconcernaboutstabilizingasourceforlaw'slegitimacy oridentity,sothislaterworkhasseemedattimestosetasidetheconcerntodemonstrate thedominanceofthemarginbythecenter,theuncertainbythecertain,ortheinformalby theformalinlegalcultureinordertopursueamoreexperimental,shiftingcriticalpractice. Sometimesthishasresultedinamorefluidstyle,inamovefromstructuralsymmetryor historicaldominationtoanexplorationoftherips,tearsandunpredictabilitiesinthelaw orofthepersonal,experientialandprivateinlegalpractice.
Muchofthisratherdiverseworkismarkedbyinvocationoftheworkofpost-modernor post-structuralistFrench, GermanorAmericanphilosophers, culturalanthropologists and feminists.TheworksofsuchasBarthes,Baudrillard,Bourdieu,Deleuze,Derrida,deMan, Foucault,Irigaray,Kristeva,orLacanseemedtorespondquitedirectlytotherelationship between critical theory and structuralism which had troubled critical legal scholars. As a philosophical matter, these works seem to be trying to reintroduce the historical subject bracketed by structuralism without falling into the mechanical determinism or transcendentalnostalgiacharacteristicoflatecriticaltheory.Theirworkshiftsamongthe affirmation, denial and transcendence of the prevailing relations between subject and object which reasserted themselves within critical theory and structuralism. In that they seemedtopromiseawayoutofpreciselythedilemmaofearlycriticalwork. WemightalsounderstandthefascinationthesenewtextsheldforsecondwaveCLSfolks by focusing on their sophistication. I said that CLS work contained both a crude and a sophisticatedversionofbothcriticaltheoryandstructuralism,andthatthesetwoversions worked together to stabilize CLS as an alternative to the mainstream. We might think of thesecondwaveasanoholdsbarredextensionofthesophisticatedreadings.Andthese works were suitably current, obscure, available in paperback, and themselves often monarchnotestophilosophictextstoodenseanddauntingfortheyounglegalacademic uneasyabouttraversingforeignterrain. Separated somewhat from the mainstream project, the young critic could more easily indulgeawholeheartedturntophilosophyandtheembraceofforeignthought-exactlyas lawandeconomicshaddone.Inthissense,muchofthisnewerworkseemsmoreclearlyto haveleftanydialogwiththemainstreambehind,becomingpreoccupiedwithcompleting the insights of critical and structural commentary on the impossibility of definitive doctrinalorcontextualelaboration.Whatbeganasextensionsoftheconstructivedoctrinal and critical theoretical projects of the mainstream (into structuralism and critical theory) now seemed to have left those projects behind even as the insights (from structuralism andcriticaltheory)whichhadmadetheoriginalrepetitionpossiblewereextended. Thisdeparturetothezoneofpurethoughtwasbynomeansacomfortableone.Forone thing, such a strong departure from the mainstream -even if it seemed simply an extension of what CLS had been doing all along and no more dramatic in its move to interdisciplinary terrain than law and economics -was difficult for legal academics to sustain.Theairgotthinwayoutthere,sofarfromlawintotheory.Thecruderassertions of earlier CLS scholarship had stabilized more than critical legal studies' relationship with themainstream-theyhadalsostabilizedtheCLSscholarasalegalacademic. Moreover, the uneasy fascination of legal academics for fancy theory is in some sense rendered more acute by the very traditions these scholars sought to import. Just as CLS scholars had difficulty accommodating the aspirations of critical theory and structuralism totheircontinuedparticipationinascholarlydiscourseofdoctrineandtheory,sothepost-modernhasdifficultyaccommodatingtheanti-disciplinaryaspirationsofpost-structuralist thoughttohiscontinuedparticipationinthecultureofthelegalacademy.Indeed,nothing could be more at odds with the post-structuralist enterprise than an invocation of the certifiably erudite European. This wave of European theoretical work is about refusing preciselythemodeloftheoreticalapplication,philosophicimportation,indeedofdefinitive scholarly analysis which seems signaled by the suggestion that "one really must read FoucaulttosayanythingmeaningfulabouttheUniformCommercialCode". In the event, however, perhaps the post-modern has not ventured so far -perhaps, far from departing law'sambit, hehonors lawwithhis philosophy.Forallthenewcitations, much post-modern legal scholarship echoes a great deal that was familiar to the mainstreamandtoearlierCLStypes.Forexample,likethemainstream,thepost-modern moves subtly between legal text and legal culture, recapitulating the move to theory as supplement for an argument of historical context or doctrinal elaboration. At this preliminary level, moreover, it seems that the distinctions within post-modern legal scholarship between say, Foucault and Derrida or feminists and Frenchmen recapitulate therelationshipbetweencriticaltheoryandstructuralismwhichkeptCLSinlegaldiscourse with the mainstream -itself divided between projects of criticism and reconstruction whichreliedupontraditionsofhistoryandlogic. Ortaketherelationshipbetweenopennessandclosureinlegalculture-thepost-modern seemsasfascinatedastheCLSscholarbythedifficultiesposedforthemainstreamproject ofanindependentandforcefullawbythefluidityofdoctrine.Inearlierworkwefounda strongly asserted indeterminacy of both historical causation and doctrinal elaboration coupled with, surrounded by, imbedded in, some crude theory of historical agency. So here, we find the indeterminacy of legal doctrine and the impossibility of definitive historical accounts passionately defended, and often imbedded in some theory of narrative,ofperspectiveoroftheprioritytobeaccordedsomeparticular"telling". Yet here we also begin to see what is distinctive about post-modern work, for the preoccupation is strangely reversed. Where CLS had focused on indeterminacy, the postmodern often seems to focus on the mechanisms of closure, imbedding a complicated account of doctrinal privilege and historical happenstance in a rather crude assertion of indeterminacy. Or take the CLS fascination with internalization, with identity, with the inside of legal scholarship.Ifanything,theturninwardhasbeenacceleratedbythelatergeneration.For CLS this preoccupation usually took the form of a critique of the legal process, and an assertionoftheautonomyofthelegalacademy.Wesawthisintheimportancewhichthe relationship between the mainstream and CLS came to have. For the post-modern generation this has often taken the form of a critique of the legal academy -of the interpretative process -coupled with a more aggressive assertion of self. Thus, we find work about CLS -and about the relationship between CLS and the writer rather than betweenCLSandthemainstream-andabouttheexperiencesoftheauthor,documenting theprofessional,thepersonal,andtheprivate.Inthiswecanseetheagencyofscholarship in motion -from the judgment of the mainstream, submerged in process, through the importance of the movement, submerged in argument, to the strong valorization of the self in post-modern work. And this final move is an odd one, for the interdisciplinary literatures relied upon by the post-modern concern little so centrally as the disestablishmentoftheautonomousself. Before exploring the difficulties posed for the post-modern legal scholar, by this preoccupationwiththeself,weshouldbegintotakenoteofthemechanismswhichmark distinctions among scholarly strands. As we saw, CLS marked its difference from the mainstream in two ways. First, by extending and separating the projects of construction and criticism by moving to critical theory and structuralism. Second, by rearranging the relationship between method and program, theory and practice, insistence and humility. ThemovefromearlyCLStomorepost-modernscholarshipwasmarkedsimilarly. Like CLS, the post-moderns began with an extension of the project of their predecessor, marked by a change in interdisciplinary affiliation. The rearrangement of the CLS project wasmostclearlymarkedbyaseriesofreversals:fromopennessintheshadowofclosure toclosureintheshadowofindeterminacy,fromlegalscholarshipintheshadowoftheory totheoryintheshadowoflegalscholarship,fromanalyticsophisticationintheshadowof crude theoretical reduction, to theoretical sophistication in the shadow of crude selfassertion,andsoon.IfthetheoreticalvoiceofCLShadbeencoy,thepost-modernseems bold.WheretheCLSpreoccupationwiththedistinctivenessofhismovement,and,aswe willsee,ofhispolitics,hadbeenbold,thepost-modernismorelikelytodemur.Wherethe CLSauthorreconfirmedthehumilityofthemainstream,thepost-moderntendedtoflaunt his fascination with Nietzsche, with an overfilling of boundaries, an exuberance, and the assertion of play. In short, if CLS had explored the reversals within mainstream legal doctrine and culture, between public and private, or objective and subjective or among rules and standards, the post-modern work models this reversibility in its relationship to CLSandthemainstream. However marked by shifts in interdisciplinary taste (down with Marx, up with Nietzsche) thesereversalsaremostimportantasshiftsinemphasisandtone-shifts,inotherwords, ofvoice,ratherthanalternationsbetweenprogramandmethodasthemarkofscholarly distinctiveness. And in general we find in post-modern work a move to rhetoric, to the study of argument, which simply sets aside the content and objective of the scholarship understudy.Atfirstglance,thismovetorhetoricseemscomfortable.Itseemstoreturnto the legal process -not the process of institutions or doctrines, but of conversation. And yet, this move confirms the scholar's involvement with the self, for what marks a man's charactersoplainlyashisargument?G e r m a n L a w J o u r n a l This move to voice and this strange post-modern assertion of self are troubling. For one thing, the move to an interactive process and the move to self seem somewhat at odds withoneanother-anditisunclearhowthenotionofrhetoricmightunitethemexceptas an assertion that they are joined. Indeed, the problem should remind us of the difficulty the mainstream encountered squaring the independence of law with its critical bite. To sustainthisdoubleassertion,thepost-modernislikelytoresorttoacertaincrudenessof hisown-usingthemovetorhetorictoflattenratherthanenrichthecomplexityofboth self and context. The famous incantation "there is nothing outside the text" comes to mean"thereareonlytexts"ratherthan"alltheoutsideisalwaysalreadyin". American legal scholars of the post-modern persuasion, no less than other American interdisciplinary poseurs are thus subject to indictment for desecrating the insights of thoughtintheserviceoflaw.Puristsmightfindtheir"use"ofDerridapartial,reductionist, mistaken, banal. Post-modern legal work appears this way to those who behold it from otherdisciplinesbecausethelawisallofthesethings,becausetheenterpriseofeclectic cross-disciplinaryingestionisallofthosethings,becauselegalscholarsnormallydon'thave PhDs. AsitwasforCLS,however,thiscrudenessisanintegralpartofthepost-modern'sabilityto sustainhisargumentandintegrity.Itisbyoscillatingbetweensophisticationandcrudeness -between insight and its denial -that the post-modern approaches the old problem of doctrine and theory. The impossibility and necessity of both can only be simultaneously comprehendedbyasinglevoiceifthatvoiceisbothassertiveanddisembodied.LikeCLS, the post-modern combines a critique with a restatement. The stability of post-modern scholarshipisprovidedbythecontinuityofthevoice-therecognizabilityofironyperhaps -whichcanbothreturntoretracethestatementsofthemainstreaminanarchreversalof CLScriticismwhileextendingtheCLStheoreticalcritique. This only works so long as overt discussions of theory are avoided -or so long as the sophisticated theoretical proof that the post-modern has accepted and gone beyond the criticisms demonstrated by critical legal studies' interdisciplinary roamings can be separatedfromthepost-modern'srathercrudereturntomainstreamelaborativeprojects. Wemightthinkofthepost-moderntryingthissocialexperiment:noddingearnestlywith themainstreamwhilewinkingatCLS,andthendebatingfuriouslywithCLSwhilewinking knowinglyatthemainstream. Itisperhapstheanxietygeneratedbythisexercisewhichhasledtotherathermoreovert effortsatself-expressioninpost-modernscholarship-andtoeffortstogroundthewink andthenodinsomesocialmargin.MuchofthelaterCLSworkhasbeenpreoccupiedwith issues of gender, race and personal identity or with the work of CLS and the process of working.Thus,theflighttoself-assertionhasbeencoupledbyanequallystrikingflightto thevoiceofsocialmarginality.Wefindthen,atthecoreofthepost-modern'sturninward, anechoofthemainstream'sanxietyaboutthesimultaneousautonomyandconnectedness oflawitself,restatedhereasanidentityproblem. The post-modern extends the CLS turn from discussion of the relationship between law and social life to an internal focus on the law. He also extends critical legal studies' internalization of the social context within law -its focus on law as a restatement of its relationtosomesocialperiphery-toanewexoticperiphery,tothefemale,theblack,and soon.Thismovefocusesontheidentityoflaw,ofthelegalscholar-indeedofCLS-asa recapitulation of its relationship to this margin -seeing in the CLS practice of assertive engagementamethodwhichiswhiteandmale. This move to reawaken or capture -or, less kindly, to exploit -the exotic margins of establishmentculturehasatheoreticalandcontextualface.WefindinlaterCLSworkfar moreinvocationsofthetheoryoffeminismandofracism,evenasuggestionthatthelegal scholar's interdisciplinary roamings be pursued on an affirmative action basis. The more important face, however, has been political, institutional and pragmatic. The move from earlytolateCLShasbeenconductedfarmoreovertlyasatransformationinthepolitical commitments and deployments of the movement than as a change in interdisciplinary focus. To explore that transformation, we will need to think more broadly about the relationshipbetweenlegalscholarsandtheworldofpolitics.
C.LegalScholarsandtheWorldofPolitics
Legal scholars have an uneasy relationship to political life. To an extent this expresses contemporarylegalculture'suneasinessabouttherelationshipbetweenlawandpolitics. AtleastsincetheNewDeal,legalculturehaspresenteditsrelationshiptopoliticalculture inavarietyofambiguousways.Lawpurportstobebothabove,removed,orneutralwith respect to political life and the procedural rules, the instrumental expression, the forum andhistoricalembodimentofpoliticalculture.Althoughcertainlyindependentandableto bringitsownuniqueattributestotheprocessofsocialmanagement,afterrealism,lawhas cometoseemfullyenmeshedinthepoliticalprocess. Toanextent,thelegalscholar'suneasinessaboutpoliticallifeexpressesthelegalacademic profession's struggle to sustain its distinctiveness in the post-realist period. The difficult double relationship between law and politics characteristic of legal culture generally is recapitulated in the legal academy's self image -most particularly in the relationship between legal academics and their classmates in government and legal practice. As academics, we want to be less political than they, but as lawyers, we feel we should be morepoliticalthanourcolleaguesinthehumansciences. To get around this difficulty, legal academics often style themselves as judges -above, beyond,neutralwithrespecttotheinterestedpartyorpractitioner,andafterorinnocent G e r m a n L a w J o u r n a l ofthemessinessoflegislativeorsovereignchoice.Asscholars,associatingourselvesnow with the world of ideas, we may even style ourselves as judges of the judiciary, making assessments in teaching and writing about cases which were "correctly" or "incorrectly" decided. But we also pose as the facilitator, partner and servant of both the practicing lawyer and judge -"restating" their wisdom and training their staff. In our teaching we speak the law in both of its voices -as a disembodied apolitical culture which simultaneously transcends temporary political accommodations and seems trivial in its technical detail and as a set of procedures and instruments within which we situate and expressourselvesaspoliticalcitizens. Thisdoublerelationshiptopoliticsisreassuringtothoseofuswhoareinfactuneasyabout theinstabilityofpublicpoliticalcommitment.Thelegalscholar,likethelaw,canseemboth engagedandsecure.Politics,withallitspassionandintrigue,canbeenjoyedasapastime orprivateavocation.Whenitcomestopolitics,thelegalacademictypicallymarkswithin himselfadivisionbetweenpublicandprivate,aninternaldivisionbetweeninstitutionalor professional neutrality and private commitment or consumption. But this division has another,lessconscious,dimension.Forthelegalacademicremainsprofessionallyneutral preciselytopreservehisroleinpublicpolitics,andconsumeshispoliticsprivatelyprecisely becauseheregardstheprivateasthezoneoffrivolity. Inpublic,perhapsintheclassroom,thelegalacademictypicallypresentsthelawasboth toodelicatetowithstandtheravagesofdirectpoliticalstruggle-inneedofhisprotection and fealty -and as the honorable and direct expression of well considered political accommodation. Politics in the classroom seems both destabilizing, a breach of faith, threatening our special expertise, collapsing our discipline into a pale technical colony of politicalscienceandnecessary,ennoblingouranalysisoftheConstitution,thearguments ofcommonlawjudgmentsorthelegislativebackgroundofsomeNewDealstatute. This public faith is sustained by a private cynicism. The legal academic is not naive -he knowsthisimageoflaw'srelationshiptopoliticscannotbecorrect.Inbetweenthelines, between his lectures, in the anecdotes, he communicates a cruder vision -of politics everywhere, of himself as a public personage, responsible. And he is responsible both to assert the judgments of faith and to admit the realism of power. Above all, the legal academicisbalancedinhisassessmentofhimself,hispoliticsandhislaw. I.Themainstreamreformer Themainstreamlegalscholarmanagestheseuneasyrelationsgracefully,inacomplicated seriesofpractices.Amoonmanmightbestruckfirstbythefactthatnobodyinmainstream legalacademiatalksverymuchaboutpolitics.Professionally,themainstreamlegalscholar typically shares legal culture's comfortable distance from partisan political commitment andhetypicallycomportshimselfinbothteachingandscholarshipsoastoavoidpolitical advocacy. But this impression will easily give way -like those perceptual tests which resembleeitherarabbitorafence-totheimpressionthatmainstreamlegalscholarstalk ofnothingbutpolitics. Acommonfantasyabout"politics"sustainsthisdoubleimage.Mainstreamlegalscholars generallyequatepoliticswiththestate.Itisthestatewhichprovidesthearenaforpolitical actionandmakespoliticalchoices.Itisthestatewhichrecognizespeopleascitizensand employspeopleaspoliticians.Inthisarena,inthestruggleofinterestsandcommitments, the political remains resolutely a matter of the conscious, of the public, the visible, the overt. For all the mainstreamer might consume his politics in private, he does so as a matter of conscious decision. For the state, there is nothing beneath the surface, just as themainstreamerknowsnounconscious. The mainstream legal scholar has two attitudes towards this public space. First, he is concernedtoretainhisdistanceandindependencefromthestatetoretainhisstatusasan intellectual. This independence underwrites the value of his wisdom and the gives him confidenceinhisclassposition.Second,hewantstodeploythestate,guideit,instructit, manageit,workforit.Hewantshisopinionstobetransformedintostatepolicy,andfor thistheymustberedolentwithpoliticalsavvy. Generally,themainstreamlegalscholarmanagesthetensionbetweenthesetwosidesof his fantasy about politics by reference to his professional role. Exactly as he might feel a lawyermustarguewhileaprofessormustjudge,sohehasdevelopedaprofessionalimage oflawprofessor'spoliticswhichsquareshisdesiretopreservehisindependencewithhis ambition to serve. The complicated relationships between private advocacy and public neutrality, between public faith and private cynicism, like the relations between constructive doctrinal elaboration and engaged critique, permit the mainstream legal academictosustainarelationshiptopoliticallifebymediatingitthroughlegalcultureand thelegalpractitioner. Thus, for example, the mainstream legal academic usually seems to experience his commitment to law itself -to its preservation and reform -as a political expression. He teaches thepolicy andjustificatoryargument oflegalculture asif itexpressedapolitical commitmentandinvolvementforthelegalprofessional.Heoftenassociateshimselfwith thereformworkoflawyers.Thedifferencebetweenpreservationanddeploymentisthus displacedfromthemainstreamer'spersonalambitiontothelaw. This practice renders the mainstream scholar's politics representational. Although he acknowledges,oftenemphatically,thatlawbrushesupagainstpoliticsmoredirectlythan he would himself, particularly in the classroom, he serves that law best by his distanced "academic"stancetowardsit.Hisownprofessionalpoliticalworkisusuallydoneinservice of the law and the profession -codifying, compiling, systematizing, recommending, proposing, elaborating, and perhaps even advocating legal doctrine. When he asserts himself in class, it is in the mode of judgment -about a sovereignty past -rather than assertionaboutasovereigntytocome. Hemustrestrainhimselfinhisspeech,confinehimselftospeech,notsimplytopreserve the foundation for his opinion, but to serve the state -by respecting its commands and entering its service, as citizen advocate or state official. All this edifice of restraint and expression,ofpreservationandsovereigndeploymentisultimately-andnophrasefigures larger in the political lexicon of the mainstream -"in the public interest". In short, the mainstreamlegalacademicstandsforthepoliticalactivityofandforothers. The mainstream legal scholar, of course, is neither naive nor earnest about this relationshiptopoliticallife.Hehasproblematizedenoughcasesandtracedenoughfailed legislative intentions to be cynical about the politics of practice and policy. He may have alreadycometoservethestateorpracticedasalawyer"inthepublicinterest".Indeeditis thedistanceanddoubt,evencynicism,abouttheseactivitieswhichgenerateshisposition asanacademicinthefirstplace.Hemaybeasproudofhissavvyasofhisjudgment. But this distance also suggests a discomfort, an uneasiness about academic work in the service of a profession. The legal academic's willingness to speak in his own voice about politicalmattersseemsdiminished-justashecametoseemunwillingtospeakinhisown voice about the world of ideas. Despite its assertion that politics is the stuff of his profession's practice, the modern legal voice has submerged its political commitment, tyingitselftoaprofessioninwhichhehasonlythemosttenuousfaith. Letmeformulateanexample.Amainstreamteachermightsay,whendiscussingthepolicy optionsopenedupbysomedoctrinaldiscussion,"wecoulddothis,orthat,orsomeother thing -it all depends upon what you want". The voice formulating the legislative alternatives in this way moves from the first to the second person plural in a time and place somewhere between always or whenever and soon, after graduation. Initially -in the opening "we" phrase -such a statement constitutes a class identity somewhere between social engineer and general will and seems located in the present. The second phrase, the implementation, seems addressed to a student body constituted as practitioners, those who will actually live out the practice of social engineering in the public interest while the teacher remains behind in the academy. It is by combining momentssuchasthese-rhetoricalmoments-thatthemainstreamlegalscholarisableto retainbothhisindependenceandhisambition.
II.Thecriticallegalscholar
Intheeyesofthemainstreamacademyandthepress,ithasbeenthepoliticsofCLSwhich havemostclearlymarkedthemovementasanopposition.Inmanywaysthisseemsodd, for the politics of CLS is structured much like that of the mainstream, continuing the mainstream'stroubledandanxiousrelationswithpoliticalculture.AfirststatementofCLS politics might have three credos: to the left of the mainstream legal scholar, with the progressive practitioner, for the socially marginal. There is little here to differentiate the CLSlegalscholar. Thefirstpointmightsimplybeamatterofpersonal,privatecommitment,andittroubles the mainstream to feel it is bothered by the politics of its colleagues. Moreover, CLS scholarspresumablyopposemainstreamlegalacademicculturepartlyasrepresentativeor handmaidenor"reproducer"oflegalculture'sbadpolitics.Inthissense,aslegalscholars, their politics is similarly displaced through academic activity onto legal culture and the legalprofession.TotheextentCLSscholarsimaginethemselvestobeworkinginalliance with progressive practitioners -with whom they have as uneasy a relationship as that between mainstream legal culture and the profession -they seem to reaffirm the mainstream's commitment to politics by others. When they imagine that a legal scholarship of doctrinal elaboration and criticism executes political commitment, they seem to reaffirm the mainstream's image of a removed scholarly identity. When the CLS critic situates himself with the mainstream academic, as a scholar working on behalf of practice,valorizingthepracticeoftheleftbar,hereaffirmsthelawyer'srepresentational role-inthepublicinterest. Takenabitmoreslowly,thepoliticsofCLSscholarsmightseemanextension,orperhaps "radicalization"ofthepoliticalcultureofthemainstreamlegalacademic.Understoodthis way, much of what CLS does might well sound like a challenge to the mainstream. Sometimes,forexample,thecriticallegalscholarwouldtakethemainstreameruponhis claimtoindependence,askingformoreunencumberedpoliticalspeechbylegalscholars.If youbelieveit,whynotsayso?Themovetoamoreoverttonebyitselfseemsimportant, for it seems to bring political commitment and doubt into the legal academy. Yet it was preciselytheencumberednatureofpoliticalspeechwhichmadepoliticsseempossibleto themainstreamer.Open,unabashedreferencetopoliticsinlawteachingmakespeoplestudents, colleagues, and, most importantly, I think, the critical legal teacher himselfuneasy. FortheCLSscholar,theovertdisplayofpoliticsintheclassroomorinwritingthreatenshis participation in the culture of legal academia -undercutting his independence, oppositional bite and believability as resolutely as it would that of the mainstream. Moreover, such overt political commitment often seems to clash with his intellectual insistence on the openness of legal culture -on the impossibility of hooking given doctrinestospecificpoliticsandhistory. Sometimes, by contrast, the critical legal scholar might take the mainstreamer up on his claim to eschew political speech, resolutely opposing any discussion of "policy" which mightobscurehisprojectofdoctrinalelaborationandcritique.Ifthelaw'ssoautonomous, lets see if it can sustain this. This return to an unapologetic scrutiny of doctrine seems important,foritavoidstheeasypatoisofjustification.Butastrongdenialofpoliticsmakes legal scholars as uneasy as an overt political commitment. Sometimes it is simply not noticed-itwouldbejustlikethelefttopretendtodiscussonlydoctrine.Usuallyitsimply increases the pressure for other, severable, but correspondingly overt indications of politicalcommitment. And indeed, the critical legal scholar sometimes invokes direct political activity -either work as a practitioner (perhaps in a clinical setting), or in the reform of legal education itself. When he does so, he meets the mainstream scholar who has always already been outthereintheclinicandwhospendsaninordinateamountoftimewithreformoflegal education. Nevertheless, the CLS tone again seems different, more assertive, more insistent. Sometimes it must sound to the mainstream scholar like praying on street corners.Yetthetonalchangealsomarksachallenge,extendingthemainstream'sambition for sovereign deployment, taking the mainstream scholar up on his commitment to politicalaction. This challenge is most acute when the CLS scholar brings it home to the legal profession and academy -emphasizing and extending the public interest into the academy and profession.AndtheCLSscholar-aspartofhisgeneralturninward-isoftenassociated withamoreaggressivestyleoffacultypolitics.Sometimesthismeansdeploymentwithin the faculty institution on behalf of excluded groups -students, minorities, women, etc., bringing the representational political culture of the mainstream into the university. Althoughtheseeffortsremainrepresentational,theysuggestanendtotheindependence of the institution -as of its unencumbered judgment -as threatening as the move to a more political speech, if for no other reason than that they promise to bring the client hometodinnerthroughaffirmativeactionhiring,etc. For the CLS scholar, a strident institutional politics is also troubling. No less than the mainstreamer, he might feel these are efforts which cannot be sustained over the long haul,foreachsuccessthreatenstodilutehisauthorityasanindependentacademic,slowly stranglingthegoosethatlaysthegoldenegg.Withhowevermuchmachogustohemight claim otherwise, he too fears he might have to go into practice or seek refuge in philosophy. Yet if he fears his success, he also suspects that reform of the legal profession cannot possiblyfulfillhispoliticalambition.Nolessthanthemainstreamisheenthralledwiththe possibilityofamoresweepingsovereignauthority.Hiringanotherwomanatyourschoolis not the same as reforming national employment discrimination law. Local efforts seem self-serving,hyped,adistractionfromthemoreimportantpoliticalworkofbecomingthe sovereign'sopinion.Strengthening,extending,evenradicalizingthesemainstreampolitical activitiesandcommitmentsseemedchallengingbecausedoingsoineachcaseheightened the tension between the legal scholars' desires for independence and engagement -for themainstreamandforCLS.Atthesametime,moreover,advocatingbothmoreassertive political speech and more engaged institutional politics began to demonstrate the tradeoffs and tensions among the various approaches to politics taken by mainstream legal scholars.Morepoliticizedopinions-speakingoutasalawprofessor-andmoreengaged politicalactiononlygotogetherforindividualswhosepersonalcacheisstrongerthantheir institutional or class status as intellectuals be they mainstream reformers or campus radicals. For the rest of us, the one cancels the other. Extending the commitments of mainstreampoliticsupsettheircarefulbalance. For CLS, the most important manifestation of this difficulty came as a conflict between their intellectual critique of political program and their proclamation to be on the left. Intellectually,theiremphasisontheopennessoflegalcultureseemedacritiqueofpolitical programmaticwork-particularwhencouchedintermsof"rights".Howmightthisopinion be squared with their valorization of political work -particularly work defending "civil rights?"Afterall,ifoneacceptedtheirintellectualcritique,mightnotprogressivepolitics bepursuedequallywellbypushinglawtothelimit("completing"theprojectofliberalism, finally enforcing rights, etc.) as by pushing society to the limit ("deconstructing" and historicizing liberalism, disaggregating rights, completing the project of the market)? Criticallegalstudiesmarkeditsdifferencefromthemainstreamwhenitbegandeveloping responses to this dilemma. There have been a lot of false starts -mimicking the resolutionsworkedoutbythemainstreamlegalscholarforthesamedifficulty. Sometimes, the critical legal scholar's critique of program simply means suspending the projectofthemainstream-perhapsbyrefusingtoendalawreviewarticlewithapolicy proposal,orbystickingtobroadhortatorylanguageaboutthegoodsociety.Thistacticis familiar from the mainstream -separating the critique from the elaborative political engagement. Sometimes the CLS critique of program was broader, suggesting the impossibility of coherent programmatic thought. However strong this seemed as an intellectual challenge, it always seemed possible simply to assert that it was not true to anyone'sexperience-includingtheexperienceofthecriticallegalscholar.Challengedby the voice of political savvy, the CLS scholar could only acknowledge his own political activity, thereby heightening his self-assertion. This position seemed to heighten the distancebetweentheopinionandactivityoflegalscholars-preciselythegapCLSsetout tobridge. SometimestheCLSassertiontobe"ontheleft"wassimplyanassertion-orareferenceto private political acts, or activity in the profession. Such assertions are familiar in legal academy-Imayseemneutralordisengaged,orwhatever,butI'mnot,justaskmywife, andbytheway,whathaveyoudonefortherevolutionlately.Sometimes,bycontrast,the CLSscholarsuggeststhattheintellectualeffortoftotalcriticism,orrefusalofprogram,isa leftprogram.Butthisapproachmerelyechoesthedifficultiesencounteredwhendenyinga politicalagenda.
Sometimes, CLS critics assert that despite or alongside or before or underneath their intellectualassertionoftheindeterminacyoflegalculture,theystandforsomecollection ofprogramsandpositions.Afterworkingtheirwaythroughacriticalexercise,CLSscholars often find themselves enumerating a political creed of sorts. For some reason this tendencyseemsatleastpartlytobedemandedbytheveryaudiencewhichisdisturbedby itsaudacity.Although,theCLSresponsemaybemoreovertthanthemainstreamtendency to demur, to shrug, to refer out to the audience or onward to practice, it remains a supplement to their scholarly activity, a product of either right theory or private commitment. TheCLSscholarfacesthesamedesiretosquarethesepotentiallyconflictingpositionswith one another as does the mainstream scholar. Let me focus on two common responses. First,theCLSlegalacademicmightrelatethesevariouspositionsas"tactics"and"strategy" or "long" and "short" term projects. In the short term, private engaged political commitmentstoparticularprogramsmaybegoodtactics,butoverthelonghaul,thebest strategy is a radical intellectual distance and skepticism about rights, programs, and so forth. Mediations like this repeat the distinction between law and politics within law, as thecontrastbetweenanactivitytiedtothought(strategy)andanactivitygovernedbythe vicissitudesofaction(tactics).Thedifferenceissustainable,asClausewitzsuggested,only byanexerciseofjudgment,byself-assertion,bygenius-theindependentjudgmentofthe representationallydisengagedlegalacademic. Second,theCLSscholarmightstabilizethevariousstrandsofhispoliticsbyrelatingthem to some other, against whom they are deployed. This approach usually takes the mainstream as its target, but it may also be something as diffuse as "liberalism". In this effort,theCLSscholarrecapitulatesinhisrelationtopoliticsanimportantdimensionofhis intellectualwork.MuchofthecriticaltoneofCLSworkhasbeensustainedbyemphasison theindeterminateinlegaldoctrine.Eachdiscoveryofindeterminacy(inthedoctrines,the cases, the institutions, the results, etc.) works against some unspoken determinacy location(inthelongrun,thespecificoutcome).Thissetofimputedpoliticalcommitments works like the imputed determinacies of critical scholarship to sustain an overall critical tone. TheCLScritic'sdestabilizationofclaimsaboutthepoliticalpurportoflegalcultureworks against the background of some stable set of political images which are seen to be mediatedthroughtheactivityoflegalscholarship.Indeedtheremayoftenbeasustaining relationshipbetweenthesetwomaneuversintherealmsofintellectionandpolitics-and itisthisrelationshipwhichseemstoleadthemainstreamaudiencetodemandoftheCLS scholarpreciselytheovertpoliticalagendaheisloathtohear.Onefindsthepurportedly indeterminateintellectualclaimsustainingitspurport(andhidingitsrelianceuponimages ofdeterminacy)byreferencetoadeterminatepoliticalcreed.Similarly,theindeterminate purport of the CLS political critique is sustained (hiding its reliance upon stable client images)byreferencetoasetofdeterminatedoctrinesandlegalinstitutions.
BeyondthesevarioustechniquesforstabilizingtheCLSmovementasapoliticalalternative to mainstream legal scholarship -by grounding it in self-assertion, in a connection to a projectedmainstreamorclient,orinarelationshipbetweenintellectualandpoliticalwork -the CLS scholar has, from time to time, articulated an alternative to the mainstream imageofstatefocusedpolitics.Sometimes,thisarticulationinvokespopularimagesfrom the sixties -the state displaced by local constellations, adversarial politics by mediation, alienatedcitizenshipbydirectpoliticalengagement,representationaleffortsfortheclient by pedagogic encouragements to self help, disempowerment by empowerment, the surfacestyleofinterestgrouppluralismbythepsychobabbleofencountergroupanalysis. Of course, such an approach retains the image of the intellectual as custodian of correct theoryforapoliticalculture. Atitsmostcompelling,however,thisalternativevisionissomewhatmoresanguineabout the value of an independent intellectual political caste. In this vision, breaking the sovereign's monopoly on politics, spreading political struggle throughout the institutions and personal relations of civil society, removes the audience for persuasive intellectual opinion-andendsthefantasythatbymaintainingone'slegitimacy,alegalscholarmight some day serve the state, as either an official or a persuasive advocate of the public interest. This vision sidesteps the conflict between preserving the independence of the intellectualandsecuringhispoliticalengagement. Theresulthasbeenanintensificationoftheturninward,towardtheinstitutionsandideas of the legal intellectual as a terrain for political engagement. The effort is no longer to mobilize legal scholars for something or towards somewhere or on behalf of somebody, but simply to mobilize the legal scholars themselves, treating the institutions of legal educationasasiteofpoliticalengagementonitsown.Itisalmostimpossibleforthelegal scholar to retain this approach. The demand that he explain the importance of this selfindulgence,thatheevaluatethelongtermchancesofbuildinganationalmassmovement ifyoustartwithlawprofessors,thathecomparehiseffortswithmoretraditionalpolitical activitiesintermsoftheirimpactonthesocialmarginsisoverwhelming. Usually, the critical legal scholar succumbs to this pressure. At least, he finds himself recommending that others follow his example, organizing their own back yards. More often,heenricheshispoliticalpracticewithvocabularyandpreoccupationsofencounter grouppsychology,aninsistentself-assertion,andaninsistenceonthepoliticsofpersonal, familyandinstitutionalpossibility. These assertions are made more plausible by the cultural familiarity of the women's movement and the various self-help groups of the seventies. But these familiarities raise certain problems. Seventies culture now has an extremely bad reputation among serious legalacademics.Itseemsfrivolous,self-absorbed,narcissistic,andultimatelyunabletodo anything "in the public interest". The women's movement, by contrast, to the extent its politicscanbepursuedbymostlymalelegalacademics,seemsatbestarepresentational G e r m a n L a w J o u r n a l activity-whosebenefitscouldbemeasuredintermsoftheconcreteimprovementinthe situationofwomenintheUnitedStates.TheCLSscholarthussustainshispoliticalvisionby oscillating between extreme versions of self-involvement and self-abnegation -echoing precisely the mainstream's oscillation between preserving the independence of the intellectualclassanddeployingitinthearenaofnationalpolitics. Thisdilemmaisoftenhandledbyacertainvaguefickleness.Asapracticalmatter,thework productoftheCLSscholarhascycledthroughanumberofpotentialclients,supportingthe positionsandactivitiesofthepolitical"left"generallyorvariousdispossessedgroups.Such invocations often appear in relatively undifferentiated string cite form in critical articles: minorities,women,jews,palestinians,homosexuals,peopleofcolor,thethirdworld,and soon.Alternatively,onefindsamoregeneralinvocationofauthentichumanrelations,of theprivate,passionate,intuitiveworldofphenomenologicallycomprehendedfacetoface humaninteraction. Theseapproachesbringcertaindifficultiesintheirwake.Inthefirstplace,ifonewereto add senior citizens, shareholders, entrepreneurs, unborn children, neo-Nazis and the middleclasstothelist,onewouldhavelistedthoseonwhosebehalfthemainstreamalso purports to work. And it is not surprising that criticism should reawaken those commitments.ButtheCLSscholar'srelationshiptoalistlikethisisamuchmoretroubled one. Afterall,muchoftheintellectualworkofCLScriticizeslists-suchaslistsofrights-which distance legal culture from the objects of its concern by relying upon status categories which themselves reflect the thousands of ways law bisects society. When the mainstreamer invokes these groups, he can remain comfortable about his indirect relationship to them -he pays fealty through belief in the extension of the legal system itself. The CLS scholar, by contrast, must imagine the relationship more directly -must seemtobeabletoconnecthisorherworkasalegalscholartotheseclientswithoutthe interventionofthesystemagainstwhichthescholarhasdefinedhimorherself. ThesedifficultieshaveanimatedthepoliticaldevelopmentofCLSoverthepastdecadeor so.Themostsignificantdevelopmenthasbeenachangeinthewayclientsareinvokedaway from the combination of vague generality and intense specificity to a mystical invocation of some single other. In this mode, a single group is singled out and given a special status in CLS. Women are a recent example -we are all feminists. But the invocation,howeverreverential,istroubling. Ontheonehand,theclaimmaybethatwomenareagroupwithwhomtheCLSmovement may have rather direct, unmediated political engagement. At the same time, and more mystically, the group is identified as an unspeakable voice, absolutely other to legal culture,thepoliticalredeemeroflegalworkwhichnolongerfeelscomfortableexpressing its commitment directly to a legal client. This absent -and assertively present -subject gives the critical work meaning, grounds the work as origin and destination and, more importantly, expresses the "worthiness" of the client as successor. CLS is no longer an oscillationbetweenself-assertionandindeterminacy.Whenwomenfindtheirvoice,they willdisplacetheironictoneandresolvethecritic'sundecidability.Thecriticcanstandthe agony of his polyphonous relationship to the mainstream because when god speaks she willbeathirdworldwoman. III.Thesecondlook:CLSandpost-modernity Byandlarge,CLShasdevelopedbyfine-tuningthesevariouspoliticalmaneuvers.Allhave beencontinuedbythosecriticswhorelyuponcontemporaryEuropean"post-structuralist" philosophyfortheirintellectualinnovation.Toanextent,thepoliticalcommitmentsofCLS seemincreasinglyfragmented,dispersed,private-disconnectedfromtheprogressivebar andrefocusedonlegaleducationand,onthepoliticsofCLSitself.Thisshowsitselfpartlyin treating methodological or genre innovations in legal scholarship -the move to first personnarrativeandotherchallengestotheconventionsoflegalscholarship-aspolitical engagements.Toanextent,CLSsimplyseemsincreasinglydepoliticized,lessstrident,more bemusedorironicthaninsistentinitscriticism.Indeed,thelatestwaveofCLSscholarship hasbeencriticizedforbeingapolitical. Beyondthesechangesintoneandemphasis,CLShascontinuedtodevelopanimageofthe state, of political culture, and of the self at odds with that of the mainstream in legal scholarship. The image of the state as a "center of power" or a "sovereignty" which actuallyexists,isfactualandisthesiteofeitherlaworpoliticsorboth,whichisdeveloped independent of the narrative of law's history, alongside it, before or ancillary to law's imageofsovereigntyhasbeenincreasinglycriticized.Inthis,thesecriticalscholarsseemto seekanimageofthestateasanimaginaryrelationshipbetweenlawandpolitics,asasite for their rhetorical awareness of one another. This image -of a more rhetorical, interactive,dispersedsenseofpowerandthought-hassuggestedanalternativeimageof politicalengagementwhichdoesnotseparateintospeakinganddoing. A fair amount of recent critical scholarship describes a politics of rhetoric, of dialog, or language with its own sociological and logical coherence. The ambition is to understand therelationsamonginstitutions,individuals,ordoctrinessimilarly.Thedifficulty,ofcourse, is that such a rhetorical process sounds remarkably like the image of a "legal process" which the mainstream legal scholars of the fifties thought might resolve the difficult politicalchoicebetweenintellectualassertionandengagement.Andindeed,muchofthe mostrecentworksoundsremarkablylikeearliermainstreamwork,thedifferencesmatters oftoneasmuchassubstance. Like earlier CLS work, this problem is stabilized somewhat by a combination of selfassertion and reference to a client -but with a difference. Central to the work of legal scholarsinfluencedbypost-modernityisanelaboratecritiqueoftheautonomousself.The result is a great deal of talk about decentering or displacing the voice of the critic and acknowledgingtheimpossibilityofthetext.Justascentralisacritiqueofrepresentation. As insistent as the invocation of "women", is argument about the impossibility of an essential"woman".Thishasresultedinanoddrotationamongpotentialclients/selves,as oneafteranothergroupofnewCLSacademicshaveseizedcontroloftheconferenceonly torelinquishitimmediately-resultinginavisionwhichmightalmostseempluralisticifit werenotsoinsistentlyonethingoranotherateachmoment. Butthepost-modernlegalscholarremainsinthelegalacademy,uneasyaboutthepolitical ambiguity of post-modern work. To the more traditional CLS scholar he may seem less interested in either self-assertion or clientele. But unlike the mainstream, he does not defend the legal academy against the change in tone and emphasis promoted by critical legalscholarship.Heseemsthreatenedwithmistakenidentityfrombothsides,seemingto acknowledgethepoliticsofscholarshipandyettoremainapoliticallydisparate. Beyond the rotation among mystical client voices, the post-modern critical legal scholar hassustainedhisownuneasypositionprimarilybyshiftingattentionfromhisrelationship to politics onto his relationship to ideas, often by reference to an absent philosophical mentor -much as the CLS scholar worked by reference to an absent client. Names like Foucault or Derrida operate in post modern texts more overtly than they did in critical legalscholarship.Nolongerconfinedtoafootnote,theyfloataroundinthetextaspeople who have discovered one or another truth against which to consider both political and legal culture. In this, the post-modern seems to sustain his position by reversing the relationship of political and intellectual uneasiness. If the CLS scholar reversed the mainstream relationship to both neutrality and doubt within the realms of politics and intellectioninordertocreateadifferencefromthemainstreamerwhileremaininginthe discourse of the legal academy, the post-modernist seems to reverse the relationship between the political and intellectual tone common to both CLS and its mainstream antagonists.Thiskeepsthepost-modernwithintheprojectofpost-realistlegalacademia despitetheself-consciousnessofhisimitationofthemainstreamandthedispersionofhis affinityforthepoliticsorintellectualinsightsofCLS. Atbest,however,thismovefrompoliticstointellectionsimplyreturnsustolaw'suneasy relationshiptotheworldofideas.Thebestpost-modernlegalscholarshiprespondstothis difficultybyexecutingbothmaneuvers.Whentherelationshiptopoliticscannolongerbe sustained, the text switches to the invocation of ideas. When the double relationship to philosophycannolongerbesustained,thetextswitchestoaprojectionofsomepolitical programorclientele.Bothmovesrepeatmaneuversfamiliartoboththemainstreamand CLS. In short, the move which was to save post-modern criticism from manneristic imitationmayalsobereadtohavesimplycontinuedit.
continually reappears -as an anxiety about the status of the legal academic, or as a relationshipbetweenself-assertionandtheinvocationofclients.Theirdivergentworkscan bestbeunderstoodinrelationshiptooneanotherandtheycontinueasinglerelationship totheextra-legalworldsofbothintellectionandpoliticalcommitment.Indeed,Ireadthe movement from post-realism to post-modernism as a series of recapitulative rotationsconstantly recycling a hesitancy about intellection and political commitment. Each phase seems to have worked out a homologous relationship to a politics and a world of ideas which is both projected beyond the law and imputed to it. Differences between phases have been marked both by academic generations struggling for acknowledgement in the vernacularandbydifferencesintone. Thinkingofthesescholarlystrandsasrotationswithinasingletraditionshedslightonboth theirdistinctivecontributionsandtheircriticismsofoneanother.Butthisistoosimple.It is not enough to see these strands of scholarship as continuations. They also mark real differences in the project of legal scholarship. Although there was a continuous relationshipofmutualdependenceandstrugglebetweenthepost-realistmainstreamand theoriginalcriticandbetweenCLSandpost-structuralism,therewasalsoadestabilization whichmarkedeachstageasadeparture.Ifthesechangesseemmostdramaticallychanges in tone and emphasis, we should come to read tonal shifts as significant departures. At leastinpartbecausechangesintonesignalchangesinvoice,identityandself. The key to this second reading is to see each rotation, each repetition and tonal change withinlegalscholarshipasacollapseofthescholarlyvoicewhichtakesadvantageofthe previous strand's hidden awareness of the impossibility of its own project. Thus, the CLS scholar departed from the mainstream precisely by emphasizing political and intellectual voices present but hidden within mainstream work. The post-modern departs from CLS scholarshippreciselybecausehetakestheCLSscholaruponhisdoubts.Inafinalspin,the post-modernmightbereadtocommentontheabsurdityofhisownenterpriseevenashe readsthenuanceofthelawwithmainstreamgentility. Takethemosttypicalpost-modernlawreviewarticle.Itbeginswithacriticalandsummary introduction-locatingtheauthorandthereaderpoliticallyandintellectuallybyinvocation ofsomepost-structuralisttextandsomeclientgroup.Itthendevelopsamodel-usuallya mega-model, aping the relationship between scholarly modes of understanding and doctrinal patterns -and elaborates it through a body of theoretical and doctrinal work. This modeled instability develops a polyphonous theme which ends, somewhat incongruously, where it began, with an invocation, perhaps somewhat problematized, of new voices, new forms of social life and new scholarships. Thus, the post-modern scholasticproductlooksverymuchliketheproductofthemainstreamorCLSscholar.Itis nowonderthatit'sinvocationofpost-structuralistphilosophyseemshackneyedtothose who are unaware of its relationship to mainstream and CLS work. The form of the postmodern legal text seems to undermine its reliance upon post-structuralism just as the
